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Abstract
We introduce neutrosophic choice functions, the neutrosophic counterpart
of the Axiom of Choice, prove some results, and discuss how it effects the
foundations of mathematics in a neutrosophic setting.
Keywords. Neutrosophic logic, non-standard logics, foundations of mathematics, Axiom
of Choice, choice functions, neutrosophic choice, compensation.
The Axiom of Choice is one of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory
(ZFC) which is inherently used in many fundamental theorems of mathematics
such as Zorn’s Lemma, well-ordering theorem, even the Law of Excluded Middle
(see Diaconescu [2]). The axiom is particularly of special interest for the foun-
dations of mathematics and logic. Its non-constructive nature has led to major
discussions and some objections as to whether or not we should accept this as
an axiom or why we should accept it in the first place. Despite that ZFC is
based on first-order classical logic, the interpretation of the axioms would slightly
change if we took non-standard logics as an alternative standpoint. One of these
non-standard logics is called neutrosophic logic, founded by Smarandache [5], [6],
as an extension of fuzzy logic by introducing possibility of indeterminate values
into attributes. Since then, neutrosophic sets and neutrosophic logic has led to
an interesting theory of research with varieties of applications. For our purpose,
we will be concerned with the effects of neutrosophic logic in the foundations of
mathematics, but particularly in ZFC. We will primarily focus on the changes
when one replaces the standard notion of choice functions with their neutrosophic
counterpart. The scope of the paper will be limited to study of neutrosophic
choice functions under the given interpretation and the consequences of exchang-
ing the standard Axiom of Choice with the Axiom of Neutrosophic Choice. All
set theoretical operations considered in the paper are classical.
Given a universe U , a neutrosophic set will contain probability degrees of
membership, non-membership and indeterminacy for each x ∈ U . If U is the
domain of discourse and A is a neutrosophic set, then for each x ∈ U , there is
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a probability degree that we say x belongs to A, a degree that x does not belong
to A, and a degree that x is indeterminate in A. So a neutrosophic set consists
of triplets of probability degrees for each three attributes of each element of the
domain of discourse. A neutrosophic set is defined generally as follows.
Definition 1. Let U be a universe. A neutrosophic set A is a function from U to
the set {〈i, j, k〉 : i, j, k ∈ [0, 1]R} such that i+ j + k = 1 where, for each x ∈ U , i
denotes the probability of x being a member of A, j denotes the probability of x
not being a member of A, and k denotes the probability of x being indeterminate
in A.
Later on we will put a condition on the probability values when we introduce
neutrosophic choice functions. Throughout the paper, we will assume that the
reader has some familiarity with set theory. Readers may refer to Jech [3] or
Suppes [4] for a detailed account on axiomatic set theory. We will also use in this
paper some of the notions studied in [1]. For instance, rather than treating A as
a function, we will treat A as a set by means which will be clear in a moment.
Definition 2. Let X be a collection of non-empty sets. Let f be a function such
that f(x) ∈ x for each x ∈ X. Then f is called a choice function for X.
So given a collection X of non-empty sets, a choice function for X selects
an element from each x ∈ X. We are not concerned with the construction or
the explicit definition of such functions, as it is one of the axioms of set theory
that such a function exists for any set. The Axiom of Choice states that every
collection of non-empty sets has a choice function. Next we define the neutrosophic
counterpart of choice functions. In the neutrosophic setting, we will have degrees
of choosing an element, but also at the same time degrees of not choosing and
leaving it indeterminate.
Definition 3. Let X be a collection of non-empty sets and let x ∈ X. A neutro-
sophic choice function for X is a function f : x→ T , where T = {〈i, j, k〉 : i, j, k ∈
[0, 1]R} such that i+ j + k = 1, provided that i 6= j 6= k.
In the definition, every a ∈ x is mapped to a probability distribution triplet
〈i, j, k〉 of probability values, where each index denoting respectively the prob-
ability of choosing a, not choosing a, and leaving a indeterminate. The reason
why we assume the sum of the probabilities of each attribute (choose, not choose,
indeterminate) adds up to 1 and that are distinct from each other is because we
will later get to decide only one of the attributes as the outcome of the choice
function depending which attribute has the highest probability.
Let X be a collection of non-empty sets and let x ∈ X. First we need to deter-
mine the conditions of a neutrosophic choice function ‘neutrosophically choosing’
an element a from x, leaving a unchosen or leaving a indeterminate as to whether
or not to choose it. We will use a similar approach that was introduced in [1].
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We simply pick the attribute with the greatest probability value. That is, when-
ever f(a) = 〈i, j, k〉, such that i, j, k ∈ R satisfying the conditions given in the
definition, then we say that
(i) f chooses the element a if i > j and i > k;
(ii) f does not choose the element a if j > i and j > k;
(iii) f leaves a indeterminate if k > i and k > j.
Since the values in the triplet 〈i, j, k〉 are assumed to be strictly ordered, these
three conditions cover all possibilities. Note that either i, j, or k is the greatest
element among the three.
We define xc to be the set of all elements in x that are chosen by f , define
xc to be the set of all elements in x that are not chosen by f , and finally define
xI to be the set of all elements in x that are left indeterminate by f . If the
probability value of an index is zero, then the corresponding set will be empty.
We can surely generalize the choice criterion to an arbitrary treshold probability
value p so that we say the neutrosophic choice function chooses an element if and
only if the probability of choosing that element is greater than (or equal to) p.
Our first observation establishes the relationship between classical choice func-
tions and neutrosophic choice functions.
Theorem 1. Every classical choice function is a neutrosophic choice function.
Proof. Suppose that X is a collection of non-empty sets. If f is a classical choice
function for X, then f chooses some a ∈ x such that x ∈ X. This implies that
each xc is a singleton since f chooses one element, say a, from each set x. Then,
the probability of the element a being chosen is non-zero and is greater than
both the probability of a not being chosen and the probability of a being left
indeterminate. Since f is a classical choice function (in the sense that f does
not map an element to two distinct values) and since f does not choose anything
other than a since otherwise f would not be a function. We also have that for
any other element b ∈ x, the probability of b not being chosen is non-zero and is
greater than both the probability of b being chosen and the probability of b being
left indeterminate. This defines a neutrosophic choice function. 
Note that the relationship is strictly one way due to the fact that a neutro-
sophic choice function may choose more than one element in each x ∈ X. Having
this multiple choice property is one of the main differences between a classical
choice function and a neutrosophic choice function. We will study the conse-
quences of this property of choosing possibly multiple elements from each x ∈ X.
Second difference is obviously the indeterminacy feature of neutrosophy which
allows us to interpret basic set theoretical concepts in a non-standard way.
Now we want to examine the effects of replacing the standard Axiom of Choice
with its neutrosophic counterpart. For this purpose, we shall state the Axiom of
Neutrosophic Choice as follows.
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Axiom of Neutrosophic Choice. Let X be a collection of non-empty sets.
Then, there exists a neutrosophic choice function for X.
From classical set theory, we know that given a family {Xi}i∈I of non-empty
sets for some index set I, ∏
Xi 6= ∅.
The statement above, which we shall refer to as the Cartesian product state-
ment, is equivalent to the standard Axiom of Choice. We argue that this equiva-
lency does not hold for the Axiom of Neutrosophic Choice.
Proposition 1. Axiom of Neutrosophic Choice is not equivalent to the Cartesian
product statement.
Proof. Let X = {Xi} be a collection of non-empty sets such that i ∈ I for some
index set I. It suffices to show that the existence of not every neutrosophic choice
function ensures that the Cartesian product of all Xi’s is non-empty. A neutro-
sophic choice function f could be defined in a way that it leaves every element of
Xi indeterminate.
1 Note that So we suppose that the probability of each x ∈ Xi
being left indeterminate by f is greater than the other two probabilities. In this
case, whether the Cartesian product is empty or non-empty will be indetermi-
nate. That is not to say that the product is empty. Nor does it mean that it is
non-empty. So unlike in the classical case, Axiom of Neutrosophic Choice is not
equivalent to the Cartesian product statement. 
Despite that it looks like neutrosophic choice functions seem weaker by their
own, we can use their multiple choice property to our advantage.
Definition 4. Let X be a collection {Xi} of non-empty sets such that i ∈ I for
some index set I, and let f be a neutrosophic choice function for X. We say that
f has the compensation property over X if for each Xi that f does not choose
any element in Xi, there exists a distinct element y ∈ Xj, for i 6= j, such that f
chooses y whenever f also chooses some y′ ∈ Xj such that y
′ 6= y. In this case,
we say that y (or y′) compensates some of x ∈ Xi.
If y compensates x, then we interpret this as that y can be replaced by x.
Deciding which one of y and y′ compensates x will be explained shortly (in fact
we will define in the proof Theorem 2 that the one with the second highest choice
probability will compensate the one with the highest choice probability). So in
other words, compensation is a property which ensures that, given a collection X
of non-empty sets, if x ∈ X is a set in which no element is chosen, then there
exists some ‘compensator’ element in another y ∈ X in which the choice function
chooses multiple elements.
1It is worth noting that the sets Xi are classical sets. The neutrosophic choice function f acts
as a probability distribution over the elements of Xi.
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Example. Let X = {{1, 2}, {a, b}, {x, y, z}} be a set. Suppose that f does not
choose any element from {1, 2} but chooses both y and z from {x, y, z}. In this
instance, one of 1 or 2 gets compensated by y or z. So whenever we need to use
some x ∈ {1, 2}, we can instead use one of y or z in place of x.
The reason we demand to have the compensation property for neutrosophic
choice functions is due to the fact that neutrosophic choice functions f without
this property may contradict the standard Axiom of Choice since it could be that
no element is chosen by f from particular elements of the given collection.
We now start discussing the consequences of replacing standard choice func-
tions with neutrosophic choice functions. Essentially, we want all useful theorems
that are true under the Axiom of Choice to be also true under the Axiom of Neu-
trosophic Choice as long as the neutrosophic choice function has the compensation
property. There is an interesting catch though in working with compensation. We
will discuss this after proving Theorem 2.
Definition 5. Let σ and τ be two strings. We denote the concatenation of σ and
τ by στ . If σ is an initial segment of τ , then we simply denote this by σ ⊂ τ
(e.g. 011 ⊂ 0110). If σ ⊂ τ , then we say that τ is a successor of σ (or σ is a
predecessor of τ). If σ ⊂ τ , then we also say that τ is an extension of σ. If τ is an
infinite string, we say that τ is an infinite extension of σ. If τ is a successor of σ
and there exists no string υ such that σ ⊂ υ ⊂ τ , then τ is called the immediate
successor of σ. If neither σ ⊂ τ nor τ ⊂ σ, then we say σ and τ are incompatible.
Definition 6. A tree T is a set of strings such that if σ ∈ T and τ ⊂ σ, then
τ ∈ T . Without loss of generality we may assume that all strings are binary, i.e.
if σ is a string then σ ∈ {0, 1}k for some k ∈ N. We say that an infinite string A
is a path on a tree T if σ ∈ T for infinitely many σ ⊂ A.
Ko¨nig’s Lemma. Every finitely branching infinite tree has an infinite path.
We begin with showing that Ko¨nig’s Lemma holds under the Axiom of Neu-
trosophic Choice with the compensation property.
Theorem 2. If for every set there exists a neutrosophic choice function with the
compensation property, then Ko¨nig’s Lemma holds.
Proof. Let T be an infinite tree. We show that T has an infinite path without
assuming the standard version of the Axiom of Choice but by using the neutro-
sophic counterpart. At any stage s, let σs be a string in the tree such that σs
has an infinite extension in T . That is, if {σks}k∈I , for some index set I, are the
immediate successors of σs, then σ
i
s must have an infinite extension in T for at
least one i. Normally we would use the Axiom of Choice here to select one of the
possible extensions since there may be no uniform way of choosing so. However,
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without assuming the standard Axiom of Choice, suppose we assume that we have
a neutrosophic choice function f for T .
Case 1. If f (neutrosophically) chooses more than one such σis, then let
τ = max{pc(σ
i
s)},
where pc(σ
i
s) denotes the probability of σ
i
s being chosen by f . In other words, we
let τ be the string with a maximum probability of choice. We then let σs+1 = τ .
If there are more than one strings with equal probability of choice, we choose the
least string among them in the lexicographical order.
Case 2. If f does not get to choose any extensions of σis, then here we will rely
on the compensation property of f . If f had no compensation property, then f
would fail to choose any extension of σis and we would fail to construct an infinite
extension of σis. If l is a level in T such that f chooses no string at level l, then
we call l a dead level. Before going further, we define a notion that keeps track of
elements of T for recording strings that compensate others in T .
Definition 7. Let T be a tree and let σ ∈ T . We define the backward tracking of
σ, denoted by Bσ, to be the set of all τ ∈ T such that τ ⊂ σ. Similarly, define the
forward tracking of σ, denoted by Fσ , to be the set of all τ ∈ T such that σ ⊂ τ .
Lemma 1. If f is a neutrosophic choice function for T such that f has a com-
pensation property, then f compensates at least one string in each level l of T
with some string at level k such that k 6= l.
Proof. Suppose f is a function satisfying the hypothesis. Assume without loss of
generality that there exists some level l in T such that f chooses no string at that
level. Since no string at level l gets compensated by another at the same level,
it must be the case that at least one string at level l gets compensated by some
string at level k in two possible cases. First case is that if σ is a string at level l
in T , then f might have chosen some σ0 at level m < l such that pc(σ0) < pc(σ1),
where σ1 ⊂ σ for some string σ1 that f has chosen along the way we constructed
the tree up to the level that σ is placed on. Second case is that f has chosen no
such σ0 for any m < l. But since f has a compensation property, there must exist
some level m > l such that f chooses τ0 and τ1 at level m such that τ0 ⊃ σ and
τ1 ⊃ σ and that τ0 and τ1 are incompatible. Then, we define min{pc(τ0), pc(τ1)}
to be the string which compensates σ. This proves the lemma.
We have ensured that for each level of T at which no string is chosen by f ,
there exists a string which compensates a string at that level. This suffices to
construct an ‘extension’ for every dead level using the notion of compensation.
Continuing the proof of Case 2 of Theorem 2, suppose that l is a dead level
and suppose σs is a string at level l in T . We need to define an extension of σs.
If f has a compensation property, then either σs is compensated by some string
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τB ∈ Bσ or some τF ∈ Fσ. To see if there exists such string τB, we just need to
look at the strings at level m < l and see if f has chosen τB whenever f has chosen
σ0 at the same level k as τB such that σ0 ⊂ σs. If such τB exists, we backtrack
to τB and define σs+1 = τB. Note that we backtrack at most finitely many times
since whenever we use a compensator, we mark it to prevent for future use. For
a string σ at level l, since there are at most 2l many strings in Bσ and since f
has the compensation property, at most finitely many strings at level l will be
compensated by a string in Bσ. This ensures that the extensions eventually grow.
Suppose on the other hand that τB does not exist. Then by Lemma 1, τF must
exists. In that case, we define σs+1 to be τF . We then define A =
⋃
s σs.
We shall argue that A defines an infinite path on T . Since f is a neutrosophic
choice function for T with the compensation property, there exists at least one
string σ on every dead level l such that σ is compensated either by a string in Bσ
or some string in Fσ . In each case, σs+1 exists in T . By induction on s, A is an
infinite path on T . This completes the proof of the theorem. 
One interesting question to ask is whether the constructed path is a ‘real’ path
on T in the classical sense or rather an ‘artificial’ path. The notion of compen-
sation naturally raises questions regarding the legitimacy of the objects that are
being compensated. If we want to develop a firm theory of neutrosophic logic and
investigate problems revolving around the foundations of mathematics, having a
sort of compensation property for neutrosophic choice functions is necessary to
have in order to simulate the functionality of standard choice functions. It is
also important to note that the compensation property of neutrosophic choice
functions is not something that was arbitrarily made up. It is actually a natu-
ral consequence of the multiple choice property of neutrosophic choice functions.
Given a family of non-empty sets X = {Ai}, if a neutrosophic function can choose
possibly multiple elements from each Ai, when using the chosen elements during
the process of any construction of an object, it is reasonable to use instead many
of them whenever needed. Standard Axiom of Choice does not have the multi-
ple choice property for the fact that standard classical functions can only map
elements in the domain to a unique element in the range.
Given a collection X of non-empty sets, some neutrosophic choice functions
may choose multiple elements from every x ∈ X. In particular, if x is infinite then
the function may be able to choose infinitely many elements from every x ∈ X.
Let us call such functions, neutrosophic multiple choice functions. Such functions
can be used to prove a special version of Ko¨nig’s lemma.
Corollary 1. Let T be an infinitely branching infinite tree and let f be a neu-
trosophic multiple choice function. Then T has infinitely many infinite paths.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 2, at each stage s, given σs in T , choose two
distinct strings τ0 and τ1 in T such that σs ⊂ τ0 and σs ⊂ τ1. 
We now prove Zorn’s Lemma using neutrosophic choice functions. It should be
noted however that, similar as earlier, using plain neutrosophic choice functions
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is not sufficient to prove this. So we instead need to consider neutrosophic choice
functions with the compensation property.
Zorn’s Lemma. Let P be a non-empty family of sets. Suppose that for each
chain C in P, the set
⋃
C∈C C is in P. Then P has a maximal element.
We show that, without assuming the standard Axiom of Choice, Zorn’s Lemma
is true under the existence of neutrosophic choice functions with the compensation
property.
Theorem 3. If there exists a neutrosophic choice function f with the compensa-
tion property for every collection of non-empty sets, then Zorn’s Lemma holds.
Proof. Let P be a family of non-empty sets satisfying the hypothesis of Zorn’s
lemma. Suppose for a contradiction that P does have a maximal element. Then
for every A ∈ P, then set TA = {Q ∈ P : A ⊂ Q} is non-empty. Therefore,
{TA}A∈P is a family of non-empty sets. We use the axiom of neutrosophic choice
(with the compensation property) to form a family of sets {FA}A∈P such that
FA ⊆ TA and FA has exactly one element for all A ∈ P. How we define {FA}A∈P
now needs to be explained. For every A ∈ P, each element S in TA will be mapped
to a triplet of probability values 〈pc(S), pn(S), pI(S)〉, where pc(S), pn(S), pI(S)
denote, respectively, the probability of a neutrosophic function for choosing S, not
choosing S, and leaving S indeterminate. If pc(S) > pn(S) > pI(S) for at least
one S ∈ TA for each A ∈ P, then this basically defines a standard choice function.
Suppose there exists some A ∈ P for which either pc(S) < pn(S) or pc(S) < pI(S)
holds for all S ∈ TA. In this case, we want to compensate S. We will use the
notion of backward and forward tracking to keep record of every index B ∈ P
such that the neutrosophic choice function chooses at least two distinct S1 and S2
both in TB . Compare pc(S1) and pc(S2) and pick the least such Si with the lower
probability. Then define Si to be the compensator for S. Then mark Si to prevent
for future use. The problem is when f does not choose distinct elements and that
there is no element to be used as a compensator. The assumption that f is a
function with the compensation property however ensures the following property.
(*) For every such index A for which no S is chosen, there exists some index B
from which the neutrosophic function f chooses at least two distinct sets in TB
such that at least one of them is unmarked.
The property (*) ensures that for every B ∈ P, f either chooses some x ∈
TB due to that pc(x) > pn(x) and pc(x) > pI(x), or due to that, for B 6= C,
some y ∈ TC compensates x. In such cases, we either define an element by
neutrosophic selection or by compensation. In fact, the handling of (*) can be
described computably as follows. We keep track of indices B in which there exist
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at least two distinct sets in B that are unmarked. Initially for all B, if f chooses
x1, x2, . . . , xi ∈ B then we mark the one with the greatest choice probability. That
is, we mark xn if pc(xn) > pc(xj) for all j 6= n. We leave the rest of xj unmarked.
Any unmarked element is a potential compensator. If there exists some index B
such that f chooses no set in TB , then since f has the compensation property,
at least one x ∈ TB will be compensated. We find the compensator of x in a
computable fashion by checking if there exists some unmarked element previously
encountered. If not, we wait until the stage we encounter a new unmarked element.
Such element must exist since f has the compensation property. So we are ensured
that the compensator for x will be encountered at some further stage. So from
this it follows that there is a family of sets {FA}A∈P such that FA ⊆ TA and FA
has exactly one element (either chosen by the virtue of the neutrosophic choice
function directly or by compensation) for all A ∈ P. For each A ∈ P, let SA be
the single element in FA, and so SA ∈ P and A ⊂ SA for all A ∈ P.
Let R ⊆ P. We call R chain-closed if for each chain C in R, the set
⋃
C∈C C
is in R.
By hypothesis, the family P is chain-closed. Let M be the intersection of all
chain-closed families in P. Let C be a chain in M. Then C is a chain in R for all
chain-closed families R ⊆ P, and so
⋃
C∈C C is in R for all chain-closed families
R ⊆ P, and therefore
⋃
C∈C C ∈ M. Hence, M is chain-closed.
Clearly, ∅ is a chain in M and
⋃
C∈∅C = ∅. Hence ∅ ∈ M and so M is
non-empty.
Let A ∈ P and let A = {X ∈ P : SA ⊆ X}. Then, A ⊆ P. If C is a chain
in A, then C is a chain in P and so
⋃
C∈C C ∈ P by hypothesis. If C ∈ C, then
SA ⊆ C, therefore SA ⊆
⋃
C∈C C. Hence,
⋃
C∈C C ∈ A. So A is chain-closed.
Therefore, M ⊆ A. But A 6∈ A since otherwise we would have SA ⊆ A and this
would contradict the fact that A ⊂ SA. Therefore, A 6∈ M.
Since M ⊆ P and A 6∈ M for every A ∈ P, we see that M = ∅ which is a
contradiction. Therefore, P must have a maximal element. 
Neutrosophic choice functions without any compensation property are too
weak compared to standard choice functions since it is always a possibility that
a neutrosophic function leaves every element indeterminate as to whether or not
to choose it. Even worse, the probability of every element not being chosen may
be greater than the probability of that of the other two cases. The compensation
property is a desired property of neutrosophic choice functions to make use of
all features of standard choice functions. One puzzling question is to ask how
compensated elements are actually included in the definition of the collection
of selected objects. The choice function, after all, non-constructively defines a
collection of elements being chosen. In case of neutrosophic choice functions
with the compensation property, we are constructing an object by compensation.
Construction by compensation allows one to define rather artificial parts of the
object. To make this point clear, observe in the proof of Theorem 2 that if
l is a dead level, then no branch is chosen to extend the finite path that we
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have constructured up to stage l. To define an extension ‘in’ l, we look for a
compensator at some level k 6= l to create an artificial extension in l. So then how
is the infinite path interpreted? Certainly, the obtained collection of branches
cannot be interpreted in the classical sense. The compensator replaces a branch
on every dead level. Each replacement artificially creates a proceeding object
in a finite sequence of strings. We shall leave this discussion to philosophers as
this antinomy, we believe, can be resolved within the philosophical community of
researchers in neutrosophy.
Conclusion.
We introduced choice functions in a neutrosophic setting and investigated
the effects of the neutrosopic counterpart of the Axiom of Choice. We observe
that plain neutrosophic choice functions are weaker than standard choice func-
tions. For this reason, inspired from the natural property of multiple selection
of neutrosophic choice functions, we introduced the compensation property of
neutrosophic choice functions to prove certain statements which are equivalent
to the standard Axiom of Choice. Allowing this property has in effect the pos-
sibility of defining an interesting approach, so called choice by compensation, in
constructing an object. It is our hope that we brought into attention the interplay
between neutrosophic logic and the foundations of mathematics to point out some
of its interesting properties and that we hope it would encourage researchers to
contribute this relatively new field containing many open questions.
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